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'The inquiry is lesbian jurisprudence. Does it exist? Can it
exist? How is it different from recent "attempts" at feminist juris-
prudence,' if at all? How is it different from jurisprudential at-
tempts to ground homosexuality, 2 if at all? And if lesbian
jurisprudence exists, what are its characteristics, its concerns, its
methodologies? And if lesbian jurisprudence is being created,
what should be its characteristics, its concerns, its methodologies?
This article poses the question of lesbian jurisprudence. In
order to understand the complexity of the question, this article
first offers some preliminary definitions for lesbianism as well as a
brief explication of jurisprudence. Combining lesbian and juris-
prudence into a question, this article limits the question by re-
jecting two possible answers: that lesbian jurisprudence is feminist
jurisprudence and that lesbian jurisprudence is a paradigm capable
of universal application. The article then seeks to give present im-
aginative content to the question by drawing upon mythical meta-
phors from our collective past and by surveying science fiction
conceptions of the future. The mythical metaphors serve a pur-
pose similar to that served by the common embodiment of justice
as a woman blindfolded and holding a scale. The futuristic concep-
tions serve a purpose similar to that served by visionary texts such
as Plato's The Republic. After engaging in such imaginings, the ar-
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1. Feminist jurisprudence has defined itself as being an "attempt"; a moving
toward. See, e.g., Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State
(1989); Ann Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 Ind. L.J. 375 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Richard Mohr, Gays/Justice: A Study of Ethics, Society, and Law
(1988).
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ticle concludes by posing questions about the bases upon which any
imagined lesbian jurisprudence might be realized.
Some Preliminary Definitions
A lesbian is a lesbian
A lesbian is a woman "who says she is."3 Lesbian works have
struggled with defining lesbian, at times being creative4 and at
times explicitly refusing to engage in definitive acts.5 Nonlesbian
works have also had difficulty defining the term.6 The derivation
of the word, from a Greek island once called Lesbos, but now
named Mytilene, provides little insight.7
An often used synonym is woman-identified-woman, used es-
pecially when the term lesbian sounds too harsh, or too graphic, or
too sexual.8 Yet while lesbian certainly encompasses the sexual-
and that sexual element should not be denied 9 -a lesbian may
3. Cheryl Clarke, Lesbianism: An Act of Resistance, in This Bridge Called My
Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color 128 (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua
eds. 1983).
4. See, e.g., Nicole Brossard, The Aerial Letter (1988) (translation by Marlene
Wildeman):
The lesbian is a woman ablaze who is reborn from the essential of
what she knows (she) is .... The lesbian is an initiatior, an instiga-
tor.... The lesbian is a threatening reality for reality. She is the im-
possible reality realized which reincarnates all fiction, chanting and
enchanting what we are or would like to be.
Id. at 121.
5. See, e.g., Sarah Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value (1988). "In
naming this work 'lesbian,' I invoke a lesbian context. And for this reason I choose
not to define the term. To define 'lesbian' is, in my opinion, to succumb to a con-
text of heterosexualism." Id. at 8.
6. See Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory 155-59
(1983) (discussing various dictionary definitions for 'lesbian').
7. The use of the word 'lesbian' to name us is a quadrifold evasion, a
laminated euphemism. To name us, one goes by way of a reference to
the Island of Lesbos, which in turn is an indirect reference to the poet
Sappho (who used to live there, they say), which in turn is an indirect
reference to what fragments of her poetry have survived a few millen-
nia of patriarchy, and this in turn (if we have not lost you by now) is a
prophylactic avoidance of direct mention of the sort of creature who
would write such poems or to whom such poems would be written...
assuming you happen to know what is in those poems written in a dia-
lect of Greek over two thousand five hundred years ago on a small is-
land somewhere in the wine dark Aegean Sea.
Id. at 160 (ellipses in original).
8. The term "radical feminist" has also been employed as a less harsh term for
lesbian-which is not to say that all lesbians have identified themselves as radical
feminists or that all radical feminists are lesbians. However, as Joan Nestle ob-
serves, "I realized I was saying radical feminist when I could not say Lesbian."
Joan Nestle, A Restricted Country 107 (1987).
9. It is tempting to some Lesbians to see themselves as the clean sex de-
viant, to disassociate themselves from public sexual activity, multiple
partners and intergenerational sex. While this may be the choice for
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have sexual relationships not only with other lesbians, but also
may engage in sexual encounters with men, either for economic or
erotic reasons,10 or a lesbian may be celibate.1 A definition of les-
bian that relies on sexual activities is a partial and external one.
Whether or not one believes that lesbian sexuality is innate or cho-
sen, or whether one ascribes to some combination of the nature/
nurture debate,12 the external referent of sexual activities is un-
satisfactory. Defining lesbianism in terms of sexual feelings-
rather than activities-may be less problematic in some senses
although incurring more difficulty by third parties in identifying
other lesbians, especially of present lesbians claiming their own
history and continuity with lesbians whose sexual 'feelings' may be
less than ascertainable. Further, the focus on practices generates
an empirical problem when lesbians seek to identify predecessors
or lesbians who have lived their lives along the lesbian
continuum.' 3
Thus defining lesbianism or lesbians in terms of sexual prac-
tices is simplistic. A notion of lesbian consciousness is more versa-
tile and complete; it is a notion of lesbianism. As one lesbian
thinker notes:
To me, lesbianism encompasses three clear areas: sex, culture
some of us, it is not the reality of many others, not now and not in the
past.
Id. at 123.
10. See, e.g., Jan Clausen, My Interesting Condition, 7 Out/Look 11 (1990); D.E.
Langlois, Dick Money, 37 Sinister Wisdom 77 (1989).
11. See, e.g., Judith Beckett, Recollections of a Sexual Life, Revelations of a Cel-
ibate Time, 3 Lesbian Ethics 23 (1988).
12. For an excellent discussion about essentialist and social constructionist the-
ories of lesbianism (and male homosexuality) and the political implications, see Sa-
rah Frankin & Jackie Stacey, Dyke-Tactics for Difficult Times, in Out the Other
Side: Contemporary Lesbian Writing 220 (Christian McEwen & Sue O'Sullivan eds.
1988). See also Susan Cavin, Lesbian Origins (1985) (arguing that extreme separa-
tion characterizes human social origins and that lesbianism occurs within the pe-
rimeters of female community); Celia Kitzinger, The Social Construction of
Lesbianism vii (1987) (arguing that "the shift from 'pathological' to 'gay affirmative'
models merely substitutes one depoliticized construction of the lesbian with an-
other, while continuing to undermine systematically radical feminist theories of
lesbianism.").
13. The 'lesbian continuum' is an idea developed by Adrienne Rich in her clas-
sic essay, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 Signs 631 (1980), re-
printed in Adrienne Rich, Blood, Bread, and Poetry: Selected Prose 1979-1985, at 23
(1986). For a critique and discussion of the possible ahistoricism of the lesbian con-
tinuum concept see Ann Ferguson, Jacquelyn Zita & Kathryn Pyne Addelson, On
"Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence": Defining the Issues, 7 Signs
158 (1981). For an enlightening and class-based discussion of the problems of iden-
tifying lesbians in prior historical periods, see Miriam Everard, Lesbian History: A
History of Change and Disparity, 12 J. Homosexuality 123 (1986); Lillian
Faderman, A Response to Miriam Everard's Lesbian History: A History of Change
and Disparity, 15 J. Homosexuality 137 (1988).
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and politics (that is, of course, just about everything). To be a
lesbian is to have a world view.... We all know that being a
lesbian means breaking the rules. As soon as a specific group
universally breaks a rule, by its very existence, that group
needs a theory.14
Thus, a lesbian is one who subscribes to lesbianism as theory; lesbi-
anism as consciousness. While certainly circular: a lesbian is one
who participates in lesbian consciousness; it is no less circular than
defining lesbians as women who engage in lesbian practices. The
participation in lesbian consciousness contributes to lesbian prac-
tices (sexual and otherwise); the participation in lesbian practices
(sexual and otherwise) contributes to lesbian consciousness. They
are not coextensive, but in many ways symbiotic; although not nec-
essarily dependent on each other. This text does not mean to di-
minish practices (sexual and otherwise), and is directed to and
produced by both consciousness and practices.
Lesbian consciousness, however, needs to be claimed as both
an ontological and epistemological reality. As lesbian theorist
Marilyn Frye aptly describes it:
The event of becoming a lesbian is a reorientation of attention
in a kind of ontological conversion. It is characterized by a
feeling of a world dissolving, and by a feeling of disengage-
ment and re-engagement of one's power as perceiver. That
such conversion happens signals its possibility to others.
Heterosexuality for women is not simply a matter of sex-
ual preference, any more than lesbianism is. It is a matter of
orientation of attention, as is lesbianism, in a metaphysical
context controlled by neither heterosexual nor lesbian women.
Attention is a kind of passion. When one's attention is on
something, one is present in a particular way with respect to
that thing. The presence is, among other things, an element of
erotic presence. The orientation of one's attention is also what
fixes and directs the application of one's physical and emo-
tional work.' 5
Thus, while the phrase "feminism is the theory, lesbianism is the
practice,"' 6 has a certain resonance for feminist theory, it mini-
mizes lesbianism as a theory. Lesbianism as a theory has been and
is being developed diversely by lesbians. It is not merely about
sexual orientation; thus, it is not coextensive with homosexual the-
ories. It is not merely about applied feminism; thus, it is not coex-
tensive with feminist theory. Lesbianism takes as its content
14. Elana Dykewomon, Lesbian Theory and Social Organization: The Knots of
Process, 37 Sinister Wisdom 29, 30 (1989).
15. Frye, supra note 6, at 171-72.
16. This phrase is attributed to Ti-Grace Atkinson, see Anne Koedt, Lesbianism
and Feminism, in Radical Feminism 246 (Anne Koedt, Ellen Levine & Anita
Rapone eds. 1973), but has been often repeated.
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lesbian practices, sexual and otherwise; takes culture, politics;
"just about everything." It has even begun to take as its content
jurisprudence.17
Jurisprudence is legal theory
Jurisprudence, as defined by Black's Law Dictionary (which
does not contain a definition for "lesbian") is "It]he philosophy of
law, or the science which treats of the principles of positive law
and legal relations."' 8 On either side of the disjunctive operating
"or," philosophy and science vie for primacy in the field of law,
engendering other conflicts such as the relevance of sociological in-
sights to legal studies. Such battles and shifting ideas have pro-
duced various schools of jurisprudence such as positivism, legal
realism, and critical legal studies. The definition of jurisprudence
operative in this text has been stated most aptly by feminist legal
theorist Catherine MacKinnon: jurisprudence is "a theory of the
substance of law, its relation to society and the relationship be-
tween the two."19 While MacKinnon states uncategorically that
feminism lacks a jurisprudence,20 her work, as well as the work of
other feminist legal scholars21 certainly reveals that what has been
named jurisprudence is actually patriarchal jurisprudence. Thus,
in this text, the term jurisprudence will not appear unmodified:22
patriarchal jurisprudence will be specifically named as such, thus
clearing space for other types of jurisprudence, including lesbian
jurisprudence.
Lesbian Jurisprudence?
Lesbian jurisprudence may be an anomaly, but it is not an ox-
ymoron. The parameters of its definition are those of invention.23
What I offer here is a particular vision, admittedly personal, bound
by both time and culture, bound by idiosyncracies of experience
17. Patricia Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 Berk.
Women's L.J. 191 (1989).
18. Black's Law Dictionary 767 (5th ed. 1979).
19. MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 159. The coherence or compatibility of MacK-
innon's definition of jurisprudence with that of the various schools is not relevant
to this text for reasons discussed below.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 1; Scales, supra note 1; Cain, supra note
17; Wishnik, infra note 26.
22. This 'move' is the converse of what MacKinnon does for the term feminism
when she claims feminism as radical feminism to be known in her work henceforth
simply as feminism. See Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 60, 137
(1987); MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State 117 (1989).




and education. What I offer here is expectant of refinement and
revision, subject to critique and abandonment. What I offer here is
the invitation to discussion, to invention, to the possibilities of les-
bian jurisprudence. What I offer here is not an answer, but the
posing of a question.
What Lesbian Jurisprudence Is Not
One of the most common methodologies of describing new
phenomenon, both in the material and ideal realms, is to distin-
guish the new phenomenon from other familiar phenomenon.
With this methodology in mind, there are two initial and related
distinctions I would like to claim as necessary for even posing the
question of lesbian jurisprudence. First, lesbian jurisprudence is
not essentially a critique of feminist jurisprudence or feminist
legal theory. Second, lesbian jurisprudence is not paradigmatic.
Lesbian Jurisprudence Is Not a Critique of Feminist
Jurisprudence
Many lesbians are feminists; many are not. Many feminists
are lesbians; many are not. Lesbian theory and feminist theory
overlap, but they are not coextensive and are not reducible to each
other. Lesbianism is not a "branch" of feminism; likewise, lesbian
jurisprudence cannot be subsumed into feminist jurisprudence.
Feminist jurisprudence certainly has failed to incorporate les-
bian visions, and to that extent it is heterosexist.2 4 To the extent
that feminist jurisprudence seeks to be a critique of patriarchal ju-
risprudence from the point of view of all women, any woman-
whether she is lesbian, black, native, disabled, older, Jewish, fat,
bisexual, Asian, African, Hispanic, poor, or in any way "other"
than the (probably false) stereotype of the feminist legal philoso-
pher as white, middle-class, heterosexual, privileged-who is ig-
nored by feminist jurisprudence delegitimizes feminism's claim.25
This delegitimatization of feminism on the basis of incompleteness
is especially offensive in light of feminist jurisprudence's critique
of patriarchal jurisprudence: that patriarchal jurisprudence is not
legitimate because it excludes women.
The claim of feminist jurisprudence that 'jurisprudence' is ac-
tually patriarchal jurisprudence and therefore not legitimate as
universal jurisprudence is a valid one. The feminist claim, how-
24. Cain, supra note 17, at 197-205.
25. For a discussion of how exclusion of various women delegitimizes femi-




ever, renders feminist jurisprudence as essentially a critique of pa-
triarchal jurisprudence. While some feminists are in the process of
imagining a feminist jurisprudence that is not a critique,26 much
of feminist jurisprudence is self conceptualized as a critique.
As I am conceptualizing lesbian jurisprudence, it is not in-
tended as a critique of feminist jurisprudence-it is not a critique
of the critique. It is not, as I envision it, a request to be included in
the request to be included. Such an inclusionary request would be
at odds with an honorable tradition within lesbianism; that of les-
bian separatism. Lesbian separatism evinces not only a lack of de-
sire to be included, but also a self conscious self-exclusion.27
Separatism is not coextensive with lesbianism, but like other
strands of lesbianism, it must be honored in any lesbian jurispru-
dence.28 Further, lesbianism, whether separatist or not, is an "ori-
entation of attention":29 it is an attention toward women and not
toward men. Thus, not only is lesbian jurisprudence not essen-
tially a critique of feminist jurisprudence, but its basic concern is
different. "The terrain of feminism" is "relations between the
sexes." 30 Feminist jurisprudence is most often concerned with wo-
men vis-a-vis men: the difference/sameness debates on equality is-
sues evince this preoccupation. 31  The essential exercise is
comparing women with men; the essential goal is equality with
men.
As I conceptualize lesbian jurisprudence, it has a different fo-
cus. If lesbians are women-identified-women, then measurements
are not relative to men; men's measurements are in some sense
irrelevant.
26. See, e.g., Heather Wishnik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Femi-
nist Jurisprudence, 1 Berk. Women's L.J. 64 (1985).
27. See Anna Lee, For the Love of Separatism, 3 Lesbian Ethics 54 (1988) ("Sep-
aratism is focusing on each other as lesbians and minimizing the energy given to
males. As a separatist, when I focus on lesbians, I include all lesbians who choose to
focus on lesbians. The previous two statements define the separatist ideal."). See
also For Lesbians Only: A Separatist Anthology (Sarah Hoagland & Julia Penelope
eds. 1988).
28. Thus, like feminist jurisprudence, lesbian jurisprudence is capable of being
less than legitimate if it does not include all lesbians, lesbian separatists and lesbian
nonseparatists are among many groups, in addition to ethnic, cultural, age, physical,
and other differences.
29. Frye, supra note 6, at 172.
30. Ellen DuBois, Mary Dunlap, Carol Gilligan, Catherine MacKinnon & Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law - A Conversa-
tion, 34 Buff. L. Rev. 11, 20 (1985) (remark of Catherine MacKinnon).
31. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Anti-Subordination Principle, 3 Wis. Women's
L.J. 59 (1987); Kathleen Lahey, Feminist Theories of (In)Equality, 3 Wis. Women's
L.J. 5 (1987); Christine Littleton, Equality Across Difference: A Place for Rights
Discourse?, 3 Wis. Women's L.J. 189 (1987).
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A concrete example might demonstrate the distinctions in
possible jurisprudential approaches. Suppose a university has sev-
eral bowling teams: an all-male team, a mixed-gender team, a wo-
men's team, and a lesbian team. Each team is eligible for funding
from the university. Under a patriarchal jurisprudential analysis,
notions such as "equal protection" and laws such as Title X would
control. Each team that is similarly situated must be treated the
same. Events which will allow teams not to be similarly situated
(more intercollegiate events scheduled for mixed-gender teams,
for example) skew the equal protection analysis, as many feminists
have noticed. Under a feminist analysis, the issue becomes
whether the all-women team has resources equal to the male
bowling team: access to resources "tops out" at the male allocation.
If there are no male bowling teams, feminist jurisprudence is also
capable of mounting arguments that some other male sport (men's
football?) be taken as the measure, although in a patriarchal juris-
prudential legal system arguments of comparable worth have not
been that successful. It is difficult to imagine a court holding that
the women's bowling team must have resources equal to the uni-
versity male football team. Further, to the extent that the lesbian
bowling team's efforts to reconceptualize itself in patriarchal
terms are successful, the lesbian bowling team might have to alter
itself drastically in order to obtain the requisite funding.32
Considering the lesbian bowling team's request for resources
in a lesbian jurisprudential system might look quite different:3 3
men's athletics, whether bowling or football, would not be the
zenith. Even assuming scarce and limited resources--an approach
that lesbian jurisprudence must reexamine4--the issue might be
conceptualized as whether or not the lesbian team had enough re-
32. See Julia Penelope, The Mystery of Lesbians, in For Lesbians Only: A Sepa-
ratist Anthology 506, 523-24 (Sarah Hoagland & Julia Penelope eds. 1988) (discuss-
ing the rules excluding women athletes in the now-defunct women's pro-basketball
league from going to "women's bars" and treatment of women athletes in Olympic
games; concluding that "[slome women have made gains in the world of athletics,
but they must, in exchange, allow men to make whatever use of them will immedi-
ately benefit heteropatriarchal society and perpetuate its underlying
assumptions.").
33. The issue of the applicability of lesbian jurisprudence to the relationship be-
tween a lesbian bowling team and a university needs further exploration. See infra
note 91 and accompanying text.
34. See Murray Bookchin, Post Scarcity Anarchism (1971) (arguing that scarcity
is more than a condition of scarce resources, but is also a function of social rela-
tions, and that society is on the "threshold" of producing a post-scarcity potential of
its technology which would insure a condition of post-scarcity if accompanied by an
appropriate revolution); see also Nett Hart, Spirited Lesbians: Lesbian Desire as So-




sources to achieve its goals and pursue its interests. The issue
might not be one of balancing the needs of the lesbian bowling
team against the awards to other bowling teams. The issue could
simply be determining the needs of the lesbian bowling team.
Such determinations necessitate alternative jurisprudences; juris-
prudences which are not hierarchical and not hegemonic; systems
which do not take men as the measure of all things or as the mea-
surer of all things.
Thus lesbian jurisprudence is not merely a subset of feminist
jurisprudence or of the feminist critique of patriarchal jurispru-
dence. Lesbian jurisprudence is a different way of philosophizing:
it has different premises and desires different results.
Lesbian Jurisprudence Is Not a Paradigm
Lesbian jurisprudence does not have as its focus an inclusion
in either feminist or patriarchal jurisprudence. Concomitantly,
lesbian jurisprudence does not seek to encompass or transcend
feminist or patriarchal jurisprudence. As I am proposing lesbian
jurisprudence, it is not an overarching Hegelian system which all
of jurisprudential theory will adopt as its ultimate referent. Les-
bian jurisprudence is not a paradigm.35
Any pretense to paradigmatic status on the part of lesbian ju-
risprudence would be as problematic as the claim to paradigmatic
status on the part of patriarchal jurisprudence.36 Positing one par-
tial view as paradigmatic to replace another partial view solves few
problems. Further, the entire concept of paradigmatic thinking is
patriarchal. A theory which aspires to be a paradigm, and thus ex-
plicative of all else, is a theory which is necessarily hierarchical,
hegemonic and hubristic. 37
35. The term paradigm here is used as Thomas Kuhn employed it in his influ-
ential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Briefly, Kuhn posited
that scientific revolutions were paradigmatic shifts occurring when a scientific the-
ory failed to explain newly discovered phenomenon, inducing a period of crisis and
resulting in a new theory that explained the phenomenon. One of the many exam-
ples Kuhn used from the history of science was the shift from the Copernican view
of the universe (earth as center) to the Galilean view (sun as center). Although
Kuhn exclusively considers "physical science," id. at xi, his theories have been ap-
plied to other sciences, including the social sciences. See, e.g., Elizabeth Janeway,
Who Is Sylvia? On the Loss of Sexual Paradigms, 5 Signs 573 (1980) (arguing that
women need a new sexual paradigm "Sylvia" to replace the no longer useful ma-
donna/temptress-Mary/Eve sexual paradigm).
36. Admittedly, lesbians do not comprise the whole of the world's human popu-
lation. Similarly, patriarchs, especially if defined as white, heterosexual, middle-
class, anglo males, do not comprise the whole of the world's human population. Of
course, 'patriarchs' need not be white, heterosexual, anglo, middle-class, or even
male.
37. Given this observation, it is interesting to consider in what ways feminist
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As I am imagining lesbian jurisprudence, it does not aspire to
paradigmatic status. It does not seek to explain all legal phenome-
non; it does not seek to limit, encompass or define 'jurisprudence'.
Instead, I would see lesbian jurisprudence as part of an organic
whole, co-existing with other jurisprudences: feminist jurispru-
dence, African-American jurisprudence, disability jurisprudence
and all other types of jurisprudential approaches, including patri-
archal jurisprudence shorn of its pretense to paradigmatic status.
Thus, the process of jurisprudence would not be the process of the
'science' of law charting inexorable historical shifts from one para-
digm to another. Jurisprudential theories would conflict in certain
cases; alliances and coalescing concepts would be fluid. It might
even be messy.
The difficulty of imagining organic relationships between var-
ious jurisprudences without reference to an ultimate paradigm to
resolve conflicts demonstrates the inculcation of patriarchal juris-
prudence. How would conflicts be resolved? Who would resolve
them? How would/should resolutions be enforced? Such ques-
tions plague.
Perhaps by an example of a set of organic relationships oper-
ating within (some) patriarchal jurisprudential principles, we can
derive a clue of how lesbian jurisprudence could operate as
nonparadigmatic. Maria Costaro-Stein is a jurisprudential friend
of mine. She is sixty-two years-old, has a speech impediment, and
environmental allergies, especially to perfume and cigarette
smoke. She identifies as a lesbian, although she is celibate. Her
former lesbian lovers include a prostitute, a literature professor,
and a silversmith. She was married for three years when she was
thirty-four to thirty-seven years-old. She gave birth to two chil-
dren, one male and one female, one before her marriage and one
after. One of her children identifies racially as Afro-American;
the other as white. Maria's own mother was Catholic-Cuban; her
father was unknown; her step-father, with whom she lived from
birth until age thirteen, was Russian-Jewish. Maria worked as a
secretary in a legal services office for twenty years; she preferred
service work to impact work. She now lives in a medium-size town
in Arizona and works on a committee to preserve aboriginal land
in Australia. Maria does tarot cards at least once a day. Maria is
coach of the local university's lesbian bowling team.
Maria does not view the world with reference to any single
paradigmatic scheme. She is a principled person. She responds to
jurisprudence has adopted the patriarchal paradigmatic method (trap?) by positing
that gender explains all else. See MacKinnon, supra note 1.
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stimuli or conflict without a predetermined hierarchy or hege-
monic scheme. Imagine that Maria-a jurisprudential organic hy-
pothesis-is confronted with a patriarchal jurisprudential conflict.
Imagine that Maria is meeting a friend for lunch next Monday and
must choose between the only two restaurants open for lunch on
Mondays in this medium-size Arizona town: Plaintiff's Paradise or
Defendant's Den. Maria will make her choice based upon refer-
ence to her various identities. Suppose Plaintiff's Paradise has no
female, not to mention lesbian, waitpersons. Suppose Defendant's
Den hires racial minorities only in the less remunerative positions.
Suppose Plaintiff's Paradise allows smoking. Suppose Defendant's
Den uses spices exploited from Australian aboriginal lands. A Ma-
ria constrained by patriarchal jurisprudential principles will
choose either restaurant with reference to her various identities
and will act as an organic whole. This Maria is not unlike judges
who choose between differing principles or theories in deciding
controversies between plaintiffs and defendants. However, imag-
ine a Maria who was a jurisprudential free agent: imagine a Maria
who could choose neither restaurant; a Maria who could go to an-
other town or could cook at home. Imagine a Maria whose choices
were between two wonderful restaurants, to both of which she
wanted to take her friend. Imagine a jurisprudence that is not pa-
triarchal. Imagine a lesbian jurisprudence.
Imagining Lesbian Jurisprudence
By defining lesbian jurisprudence by reference to what it is
not, some clues arise as to what it is--or what it might be. Lesbian
jurisprudence is not a critique of feminist jurisprudence or a plea
to be included within feminist jurisprudential discourse because
such discourse usually relates to women vis-a-vis men. Instead,
lesbian jurisprudence is envisioned as a jurisprudence concerned
with lesbians, lesbian issues and problems that affect lesbians.
Lesbian jurisprudence is not a paradigm that seeks to prescribe or
explain all legal analysis in all cases. Instead, lesbian jurispru-
dence is envisioned as a jurisprudence set in an organic context.
From the exclusions, a hypothetical possibility is developed: les-
bian jurisprudence is a jurisprudence which takes as its subject les-
bians, lesbian issues, and problems that affect lesbians, and lesbian
jurisprudence is set within an organic context, coexisting with
other jurisprudences. In order to give imaginative content to the
question what is lesbian jurisprudence, an exploration of mythical




Present conceptions of law and justice retain mythic ele-
ments. The western patriarchal symbol of law often is embodied
ironically as a woman: Lady Justice is blindfolded and holds the
scales. Lesbian jurisprudence also might profit from sifting
through mythical heritages for an appropriate symbol. Such a sift-
ing has occurred in works by lesbian theorists. For example, in
Lesbian Peoples: Material for a Dictionary, Monique Wittig and
Sande Zeig explain:
The single law of the amazons was "do not steal, nor beg."
The companion lovers of the Glorious Age maintain the same
"abysmal contempt" for statutory law as the ancient amazons.
Some have adopted "do not beg" as a major suggestion. At the
end of the Concrete Age, many small groups of companion lov-
ers intensively practiced as a major suggestion "do not beg, but
steal."3s
Another example occurs in Mary Daly and Jane Caputi's Web-
ster's First New Intergalactic Wickedary of the English Lan-
guage39 which relegates the term "law"4 0 to the patriarchy and
replaces "justice" with "nemesis."41 The idea of nemesis was ear-
lier developed in Daly's Pure Lust. In her ineffable style, Daly
writes:
As Goddess of divine retribution, the Nemesis within
Pyrosophical women wills to act/live the verb which is the
root of her Name: nemein, meaning to deal out, to dispense
retribution. Unlike "justice," which is depicted as a woman
blindfolded and holding a sword and scales, Nemesis has her
eyes opened and uncovered-especially her Third Eye. More-
over, she is concerned less with "retribution," in the sense of
external meting out of rewards and punishments, than with an
internal judgment that sets in motion a kind of psychic align-
ment of energy patterns. Nemesis, thus named, is hardly irrel-
evant mysticism.42 The new psychic alignment of gynergy
patterns associated with Nemesis is not merely rectifying of a
situation which the term unjust could adequately describe.
38. Monique Wittig & Sande Zeig, Lesbian Peoples: Material for a Dictionary
95-6 (1976) [hereinafter Lesbian Peoples].
39. Conjured by Mary Daly in Cahoots with Jane Caputi Webster's First New
Intergalactic Wickedary of the English Language (1987).
Although not specifically named lesbian, Daly and Caputi's work certainly
evinces a lesbian consciousness. The Wickedary includes a definition of lesbian as
"a Woman-Loving woman; a woman who has broken the Terrible Taboo against
Woman-Touching women on all levels; Woman-identified woman: one who has re-
jected false loyalties to men in every sphere." Id. at 78 (emphasis in original).
40. Law is relegated to the "laws of lechery," the laws of the Lecherous State.
Id. at 207.
41. Id. at 84 (defining nemesis as "[v]irtue beyond justice"). The Wickedary
does not contain an independent entry for justice.
42. Id. at 275 (footnote added).
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Nemesis is Passionate Spinning/Spiraling of new/ancient
forms and connections of gynergy. It is an E-motional habit
acquired/required in the Pyrospheres. It demands Shrewd as
well as Fiery judgment and is therefore a Nag-Gnostic/
Pyrognostic Virtue. Nemesis is a habit built up by inspired
acts of Righteous Fury, which move the victims of gynocidal
oppression into Pyrospheric changes unheard of in patriarchal
lore.43
Unlike blindfolded, static patriarchal "justice," a woman
inspired by Nemesis sharpens her senses, sharpens her Labrys.
As her axe, this can cut back barriers. As her wings, it carries
her on the wind. Better than a broom, it carries her beyond
the foreground fortresses.
Nemesis is not about casuistry, nor about cautiously mea-
sured rewards and punishments. It is about flying through the
badlands, badtimes. It is about creating new cacophony, new
concord, countering destruction with creation.44
Mary Daly's notion of nemesis might be a metaphor on which
to ground notions of lesbian jurisprudence. Nemesis creates its
context as it moves within its context.45 Certainly lesbian juris-
prudence must do the same. Coupled with the anarchic definition
contained in Lesbian Peoples,46 the notion of nemesis as the foun-
dation of lesbian jurisprudence would result in a law very different
from the law produced by patriarchal jurisprudence.
A conception related to Daly's nemesis-but in some sense
rejected by it-is that of another Greek goddess, Dike. Dike, a
name many lesbians might claim, is often called the goddess of jus-
tice, but she is typically not pictured blindfolded.47 She is situated
as one of the three Horae (hours or seasons) and is attributed with
producing order both in nature and society. 48 As described by les-
bian writer, philosopher and mythologist Judy Grahn, Dike's social
function was to keep a natural balance; her name means "the
path."49 But as characterized by Grahn, Dike is neither passive
nor serene:
Dike was a storm goddess. In times when men were challeng-
ing the old woman-oriented traditions, Dike was a warrior/
43. Id. at 277 (footnote added).
44. Id. at 279-80 (footnote added).
45. Id. at 278.
46. See Lesbian Peoples, supra note 38.
47. See, e.g., U.S. Work Projects and Administration, 1938 Project, The Legal
Status of Women From 2250 B. C., vol. I. (a typewritten compilation of Codes by the
Iowa WPA, Division of Women's and professional Projects, Dike is pictured
unblindfolded. The picture can be found on the second page after the cover page of
Part VI, The Romans, between pp. 243-44).
48. See J.E. Zimmerman, Dictionary of Classical Mythology 85 (1964).
49. Judy Grahn, Another Mother Tongue 47 (1984).
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avenger against those who broke the old traditions. She is
called "Natural Justice," and her close companion (lover) is
Aletheia, "Truth." Dike is depicted riding in a cart holding
scales of justice and a measuring rod. At her feet is a wheel of
time, and she is called "she from whom none may run
away." 50
Grahn is not the only lesbian theorist to claim Dike as an appro-
priate symbol.5 1 Figures such as Dike and Nemesis, which can be
extracted from the Greek and Roman patriarchal pantheons, are
useful in conceptualizing possible foundations for a lesbian juris-
prudence. Yet we should not be uncritical in accepting exclusively
Western archetypes.52 Further-and extremely importantly-we
must examine many traditions when seeking possible embodi-
ments for lesbian jurisprudence.
For example, in the Orisha,53 there is Oya, another storm
goddess. Oya is less about "balance," than about "transforma-
tion." She is complex, contextual and clever:
In the goddess Oya, animal wisdom and ancestral repre-
sentation coalesce. It is not only in masquerade form that she
links us to an invisible continuum. Her most intimate habitat
is the ancient part of the human brain that programs commu-
nal behavior grounded in an ancestral learning. . . . For
humans to be conscious in ways that other animals are not of
the fundamental rhythms of living could be to enhance rather
50. Id. (footnote omitted).
51. For example, Nett Hart in Spirited Lesbians: Lesbian Desire as Social Ac-
tion, states:
Justice is Dike, Eurydice or Universal Dike. Dike/Tao is the path, the
way of balance, the natural order of things. The justice of Dike, of
dykes, is encompassing all participants, taking into account the whole
in balance rather than a remedy for the particular affront. Everything
is in motion, cycling, turning, changing... Justice is its own reward.
The justice of Dike is restorative .... The justice of Dike is bal-
ance. It is not the assumption of rights but of respect.
Hart, supra note 34, at 57.
52. For example, excluding "revenge" from "justice" should be examined, not
assumed. For an excellent discussion of the historical and theoretical relationships
between these two ideas, see generally Susan Jacoby, Wild Justice: The Evolution
of Revenge (1983).
53. The Orisha are the divine personifications of the Yoruba peoples of Western
Nigeria. There are close to six hundred Orisha, major and local. Many of the
names and rituals of the Orisha flourish in religions practiced in Cuba, Brazil, Ha-
iti, Grenada, and the United States. Andre Lourde, The Black Unicorn 120 (1978).
The word Orisha means "head-calabash." Calabashes are hard-shelled fruit
that are used as containers for water, food, and sacred substances. The analogy re-
flects the insight that "[o]ur heads, like calabashes, contain a modicum of sacred
substance, shared with Orisha, whose portions are plenitude." Judith Gleason,
OYA: In Praise of the Goddess 7 (1987).
54. "The Yoruba oracle, known as Ifa, is a sort of [sic] regulatory agency created
to foster a balance of forces in society.... The worshipers of a particular god or
goddess [e.g., Oya], by contrast, shamelessly extol his or her powers." Id at 2.
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than to belittle their significance. It could mean infusing, or-
dering, and elaborating them with wisdom and beauty....
When it comes to territorality, Oya is mistress of plural-
ity of boundaries, whose stress she magnifies as she crosses
and recrosses them .... She defends her children. When it
comes to establishing social hierarchies, it is she who empow-
ers the Iyalode and who assists women to take other titles as
well; and she reigns as queen across the water, in an island
midriver. She is also ... sexy custodian of the matingmat. On
the other hand,... she is responsible for the imprinting of cor-
rect ritual behavior.... It all depends on context.
Yet all these leadership roles are but the other face of
her disruptive turbulence. Finding a channel, she flows.
Blocked, she floods. Denied recognition, she rips. And occa-
sionally she'll go wild anyhow without provocation, to keep us
from dozing off. 55
Oya as a metaphor for lesbian jurisprudence takes chaos and
chance and communication between species as valid precepts.
Kali, a Hindi goddess often depicted as a wild dancer, is another
suggestion that serenity may not be the ultimate good.56 Even the
Buddhist deity Kuan-Yin, most often analogized to the Christian
Mary, is known for her furious passion as well as for her compas-
sion.5 7  Choosing one--or more-of these symbols has conse-
quences for the question of lesbian jurisprudence.
Futuristic Conceptions
We are not limited to sifting through our global past for ap-
propriate symbols. We also can eschew goddesses for cyborgs and
broaden our interspecies communication to include machines5s as
55. Id. at 254-55.
56. See, e.g., Patricia Monaghan, The Book of Goddesses and Heroines 164-66
(1981).
57. "It was said that Kuan-Yin was so concerned for humanity that, upon re-
ceiving enlightenment, she chose to retain human form rather than transcending it
as pure energy." Id, at 169.
58. As socialist-feminist Donna Haraway has developed the myth of the cyborg:
From one perspective, a cyborg world is about the final imposition of a
grid of control on the planet, about the final abstraction embodied in a
Star War apocalypse waged in the name of defense, about the final ap-
propriation of women's bodies in a masculinist orgy of war. From an-
other perspective, a cyborg world might be about lived social and
bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship
with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identi-
ties and contradictory standpoints. The political struggle is to see from
both perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations and
possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point. Single vision
produces worse illusions than double vision, or many-headed monsters.
Cyborg unities are monstrous and illegitimate; in our present political




we cast into the future for clues to the question that is lesbian ju-
risprudence. Perhaps ironically, but also quite understandably,
some of the most creatively concrete imaginings of lesbian juris-
prudence occur in lesbian science fiction or other visionary novels,
often referred to as fantasy.59 Not always utopian in stance, such
novels imagine societies which might evidence lesbian jurispruden-
tial concepts. The act of imagining lesbian jurisprudential princi-
ples in the context of the art of fiction should not be confused with
the act of advancing such jurisprudential principles. Nevertheless,
in the same manner in which Plato's Dialogues, especially the Re-
public are useful in discerning ideas of patriarchal jurisprudence,
science fiction and imaginary fiction are useful to discerning possi-
ble notions of lesbian jurisprudence. Some of this fiction is femi-
nist, some of it describes all-female worlds and some of it is
consciously lesbian. "Science fiction expresses the tension between
the possible and the impossible," according to lesbian science fic-
tion writer Joanna Russ.60 An exploration of this tension can pro-
vide constructive suggestions for lesbian jurisprudence.
In many fictional all-women societies, law or legal principles
are superfluous. In Joanna Russ's fictional community,
"Whileaway," for example, the early education of the girl-children
is heavily practical: "how to get along without machines, law,
transportation, physical theory and so on."61 In other lesbian soci-
eties, law or legal systems remain unmentioned, but there are con-
stant meetings in which decisions seem to be made by consensus 62
Donna Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist Femi-
nism in the 1980's, Socialist Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 65, 72 (footnote omitted).
59. Unfortunately, I am not an avid science fiction reader. I have therefore ap-
preciated the assistance of Susanna Sturgis and Sarah Valentine. I have also appre-
ciated the insights contained in critical works on science fictions including Sarah
Lefanu's recent book, In the Chink of the World Machine, and two essays, Sally
Miller Gearhart Future Visions: Today's Politics: Feminist Utopias in Review, in
Women in Search of Utopia 296 (Ruby Rohrlich & Elaine Hoffman Baruch eds.
1984) [hereinafter Utopia] (writing about eleven feminist utopian novels, including
her own The Wanderground, Gearhart considers the created societies in terms of
collective processes, lesbian separatism, sources of violence, use of technology and
nature and racism), and lesbian critic Tucker Farley's essay, Realities and Fictions:
Lesbian Visions of Utopia, in Utopia, supra, at 233 (writing about lesbian versions
of utopia in which she discusses lesbian identity, lesbian language, culture, victimi-
zation and racism).
60. Lefanu, supra note 59, at 22 (quoting Joanna Russ).
61. Joanna Russ, The Female Man 50 (1975).
62. See, e.g., Joan Slonczewski, A Door Into Ocean (1986). The women who
have self-named (an activity which marks them as adults) gather to make decisions
in a consensual manner:
Merwen half rose, stifling a cry in her throat. No-Yinerva must not
walk out now, though it was her right to abstain rather than block the
will of the Gathering. Now, of all times, the Gathering must stand to-
gether. A victory without Yinerva was hollow indeed.
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or by a consensus which allows individual action.63 At times, the
efficacy of such meetings is assisted immeasurably by the women's
abilities in telepathy.6 4 The lesbians' nonlegalism is often con-
trasted to the legalism of other 'patriarchal' systems.6 5 Even
where the lesbians have developed a legal "code," any attempt to
explain the 'legal system' to an outsider emphasizes the fluidity of
the women.66 To the extent that all-women societies in science fic-
I&. at 81.
63. See, e.g., Rochelle Singer, The Demeter Flower (1980). Some of the conflict
in this novel concerns the desire by some of the women to leave the village of "De-
meter" and begin a new settlement. There is great disagreement about the wisdom
of this idea, but individuals make decisions about whether or not they will leave or
stay on an individual basis.
64. For example, in Sally Miller Gearhart's classic The Wanderground, the wo-
men join together in gatherstretch:
Drawing her own presence to the center of the gatherstretch, Li, from
the Kochlias Three-Fold, brought the question before them. Li did not
address an audience but instead herself became a hearer as she wove
back and forth in her memory between narrative and reflection, de-
scription and evaluation, attempting to throw open to all the women
the information that had come to the Long Dozen and the work in
thinking the Dozen had done with the knowledge....
Sally Miller Gearhart, The Wanderground 125 (1979).
65. For example, in Sandi Hall's novel, "Book One of the Cosmic Botanists Tril-
ogy," The Wingwomen of Hera (1987), there are two planets which orbit around the
two suns they share. Hera, the lesbian planet, is lush and populated by multi-racial
(wingers and finners) and single-gendered creatures who intermingle among them-
selves and explore the universe. Maladar, the patriarchal planet, is a "bone-chilling
no-fun planet" half-covered with ice and populated by men and women who require
travel passes to traverse their world containing both drugs and prostitution. The
problem on Hera is an encroaching disease. The problem on Maladar is the birth of
a female child as Newchild and future Guider.
Hera's legal and political system is hierarchal, biologically based, but effortless:
A Leader emerged from each doublesun's brood only once every seven
or so times. Though each Heran's abilities were regarded with equal
respect, the sheer rarity of the Leaders and their role in the complex
technique of Stargoing gave them a place in Hera's society that,
though never spoken, was acknowledged as special. Somehow, Lead-
ers found themselves with exceptionally spacious quarters, consist-
ently choice foods and prominent places at all entertainments and
rituals, including Crossover. Everyone realized their uniqueness. And
among the Creators, the possibility of merging with a Leader was the
most highly desirable of all.... Her thoughts moved swiftly. It was
fortunate that the Elders lived a segregated life, due to the immense
responsibilities they had. No law or rule bound them to keep to their
aeries, but their work, the language and knowledge of it, kept them
voluntarily apart.
Id at 45-6, 56.
Maladar's legal system is much more obdurate. The law adhered to by all of
Maladar are the pronouncements of the Guider, historically a faceless and un-
known man biologically chosen, who lives separately from the people to insure his
objectivity. Thus, Hera is depicted as more communal and intuitive, without need
for law, and Maladar is pictured as more rigid and rational, requiring questions and
answers to problems.
66. See, e.g., Katherine Forrest, Daughters of a Coral Dawn (1984). An earth-
woman who finds herself on the lesbian inhabited planet "Maternas" narrates:
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tion are rigid, they seem to be so as a survivalist reaction to threat-
ening patriarchies. 67 Conventional lesbian science fiction
presumes that "left to themselves," lesbians prefer nonlegalistic
societies. There is an essentialist underpinning to this conclusion
(just as there are biological bases to some of the imagined hierar-
chies),68 but there are also indications in the novels that attitudes
toward law are socially constructed and thus situational and
mutable. 69
"But there must be problems to be solved, disagreements," I pro-
tested, vividly recalling the rancorous parting of my own parents, fi-
nally adjudicated by binding decree of the marital arbiters.
"We have no concerns here about property," she said, "and our
children are little damaged by our partings."
Id. at 148.
"What form of government do you have?" I inquired as we walked
toward this structure.
She answered first with a chuckle; then said, "Very little. We be-
lieve each of us is the best judge of her own interests. We place high-
est value on self-reliance, privacy, respect for each other, and
instinctively we oppose authority, uniformity, any kind of fixity ..
"Since you don't have formal government, you must have laws,
surely?"
"We have a Central Code and a yearly vote to determine if any
part of it needs to be changed, and-"
I halted before a huge painting....
Disconcerted, I walked on, and blurted the first question that
came to mind: "Do you have courts? There must be criminal acts
here, even occasionally."
"We have occasional ... errors in judgment or deed-which need
to be atoned for. Then we have an informal tribunal composed of six,
chosen by lot to decide the nature of the atonement."
She said quietly, "We have no equivalent of divorce arbiters or
courts. We recognize no contract between two people arising from pas-
sion or sentiment. And most disputes are caused by property consider-
ations, and we have no property here, no bequeathing of it."
Id at 161-63 (three dot ellipses in original).
67. See, e.g., Pamela Sargent, The Shore of Women (1988). This novel "de-
scribes an all-women society (men are banished at age five beyond the walls) with
rather draconian laws/ethics, mostly motivated by the desire to maintain unity and
avoid the (man-made) holocaust that nearly destroyed the world many centuries
before." Letter from Susanna Sturgis (October 12, 1989) (on file with author). See
also Susanna Sturgis, Book Review, Aug. 1989, (reviewing Pamela Sargent, The
Shore of Women (1988)).
68. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 65 (elders) The women are all related and have
extraordinary abilities, confirmation of their "leader's" status is predicated on her
emerald eyes which are identical to those of the original mother. More common is
the device of associating age with leadership.
69. A comparison of two heterosexual women that visit the lesbian societies (in-
voluntarily and with at least one male) is instructive. In Daughters of a Coral
Dawn, the woman realizes that she has been oppressed by her male co-workers and
leaves them, joining the lesbian society and falling in love with the leader. Forrest,
supra note 66. In The Demeter F/ower, Donna arrives with her oppressive husband
(the man who bought her from her father), but she remains loyal to him, uncom-
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Consequences for the Question of Lesbian Jurisprudence
There are important conclusions to be drawn from explora-
tions of the mythic past and the fantastic future. The mythic past
assists us in giving imaginative content to the question that is les-
bian jurisprudence. Choosing symbols, however, is not merely an
imaginative task with no material consequences. The selection of
symbols is not the selection of meaningless mascots. To choose
measuring rods and scales as the hallmarks of lesbian jurispru-
dence has certain consequences; we commit ourselves to making
judgments against a predetermined artifact (the measuring rod)
and to balancing two sides when considering issues (the scale).
The manner in which such symbols have operated in patriarchal
jurisprudence is obvious in the implementation of a judicial sys-
tem: the facts of each case are judged in relation to precedent and
cases must have at least two sides in order to be justiciable. If we
are considering creating lesbian jurisprudence, we must decide
whether we want to emulate this modus operandi. For we also
have the power to choose symbols which are avenging, chaotic,
communal, animalistic, or contradictory; ones who "cut back barri-
ers" or ones who "magnify the stresses of boundaries by crossing
and recrossing."
The fantastic future assists us in conceptualizing possible
properties of a lesbian jurisprudence. One startling conclusion evi-
dent in lesbian science fiction is the notion that law is not cen-
tral-it is de-centered. The strategy of de-centering is a post-
modern one, and it also occurs as a jurisprudential strategy in a
postmodern feminist jurisprudential text by Carol Smart. Smart
suggests that there is "a double trap-that of the 'androcentric
standard' and that of continuing to fetishize law."70 The first trap
is far simpler to escape from a lesbian jurisprudential standpoint:
androcentrism is replaced by gynocentrism, a fairly simple task
conceptually if not practically.7 1 The second trap Smart names
causes more conceptual difficulty. Can a philosophy have as its
premise that its own subject matter is marginal? A practical prob-
lem--or perhaps a failure of imagination and nerve-is that the
municative with the lesbians, and blames the lesbians for his death. Singer, supra
note 63.
Another example of nonessentialism is the creation of the "gentles," men who
have abandoned patriarchy. The female characters in this novel, however, disagree
concerning the extent to which males can forsake their violent habits. Gearhart,
supra note 64.
70. Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of the State 68 (1989).
71. The replacement of androcentrism by gynocentrism is also easier from a les-
bian jurisprudential standpoint than from a feminist jurisprudential standpoint.
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very lesbians who are in the best position to argue for a decentrist
position of law are the least likely to so argue. 72 It seems a bit
strange to say that "I am a lawyer (or law student or law teacher
or philosopher of law)" and my philosophy of law is that law is not
very important, and probably does not even merit much discussion,
let alone a branch of philosophy.
But in the work of one lesbian philosopher (whose field is
ethics and not jurisprudence), law is not only de-centered, but
seemingly obliterated. Sarah Lucia Hoagland rejects "justice" as a
concept that "exists to sort out competing claims within a system
that has as its axis dominance and subordination."7 3 Hoagland ar-
gues that the notion of justice is antithetical to lesbianism:
While we don't have a formal system of lesbian justice, we
tend to be attracted by the idea of such a system. We tend to
feel that without a system of justice, mean and nasty lesbians
will go around intimidating others. And that may happen at
times. But under full-blown legal systems, intimidation still
happens. What we forget is that a state can do exactly the
same things as mean and nasty individuals; only when the
state does them, they're called "legal"....
We already have the ingredients we need to interact: our
psychic faculty, intuition, dreams, imagination, humor, emo-
tions, playfulness, and reasoning. We need to develop these
abilities. And at times things just don't work out. But if in
our relationships we cannot create an environment in which
integrity flourishes, even though at times harm also occurs--or
at least if when things go sour, we can't keep them from pro-
gressing to inexcusable limits-no institution and no system of
justice ever will.7 4
Yet while Hoagland's argument may be a rejection of a patriarchal
justice and may even be a rejection of Dike's "balancing justice,"75
72. I recognize that many lesbians, myself included, became lawyers in order to
"help" others-lesbians and nonlesbians. I recognize that many lesbians, myself in-
cluded, saw law as a chance to elevate one's self to economic "security" even absent
"financially secure" class backgrounds or the "opportunity" to "marry up." I recog-
nize that many lesbians, myself included, have spent enormous amounts of time
(never to be regained) and money (much of which we continue to pay back with
interest) in order to be admitted to the legal profession. I do not intend to diminish
these facts, or to imply that lesbian lawyers act predominantly in their own self in-
terest. What I am saying, however, is that for lesbian lawyers, part of their self-
conception is tethered to the law.
73. Sarah Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics 264 (1988).
74. Id. at 267.
75. This rejection of justice has been criticized by another lesbian thinker:
Sarah Hoagland is critical of the concept of justice. In tracing the
history of justice she says, "The old testament 'an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth' and Solomon willing to cut a baby in half to deter-
mine the mother was about the extent of the biblical concept of jus-
tice."
This seems entirely too simplistic, and an "injustice" to Jewish
[Vol. 8:443
LESBIAN JURISPRUDENCE?
it is less a rejection of a lesbian jurisprudence. Hoagland's notion
of a lesbian jurisprudence might take as its symbol Oya. Part of
the problem, as always, is defining what law is.
Throughout this discussion, I have assumed that any
imagined lesbian jurisprudence would not be primarily concerned
with the imposition of rules and regulations. Also implicit has
been that lesbian jurisprudence would be concerned with collec-
tive decision-making and collective actions. Ethics is about the
process of individual choices; jurisprudence is about the process of
collective choices. This collectivity is comprised of individuals and
thus causes ethics and jurisprudence to intersect. Thus, when im-
agining lesbian jurisprudence, works of ethics, such as that of
Hoagland's, have special importance.
Jurisprudence and ethics are concerned with methodology as
well as results. Thus, epistemological concerns also must be ad-
dressed. A text which has much to contribute to any imagining of
possible methodologies of lesbian jurisprudence is Joyce
Trebilcot's recent article, Dyke Methods or Principles for the Dis-
covery/Creation of the Withstanding.76 Trebilcot's task is to artic-
ulate the values she desires her work to embody, and she derives
three principles: speaking only for herself, not attempting to have
others accept her beliefs, and not accepting any absolutes. These
principles, if accepted, certainly would influence the methodology
of lesbian jurisprudence as well as impacting outcomes. There
would be no speaking for the positions of others, no professional
'advocates': each woman would represent her own views. There
would be no advocacy, "any intent to persuade is an act of vio-
lence." 77 There could be no statutes, no rules or regulations, no
"givens." Can this be imagined?
I am suggesting that we begin imagining a lesbian jurispru-
dence. Imagine a lesbian jurisprudence that takes as one of its
principles nonpersuasion. Imagine a lesbian jurisprudence that
history, which has always included concerns about justice, both in the
bible and elsewhere. Even these two examples are not adequately ad-
dressed in Sarah Hoagland's treatment of them. The "eye for an eye"
paradigm was actually a reform over existing contemporary forms of
punishment, which called for death for stealing, and other extremes.
And the judgement of Solomon story demonstrates a woman's emo-
tional logic sense in the face of male rational violence.
Sarah Hoagland says that, "[j]ustice ultimately is tied to punish-
ment." I think of justice as having to do with restoring balance, resti-
tution, remedy, and stopping injustice.
Barbara Ruth, Taking Our Lives Seriously, 38 Sinister Wisdom 121, 128 (1989) (re-
viewing Sarah Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics (1988)).
76. Hypatia, Summer 1988, at 9.
77. Id. at 1 n.* (quoting Sally Miller Gearhart, The Womanization of Rhetoric,
2 Women's Studies Int'l Q. 195-201 (1979)).
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takes as its metaphor Oya. Imagine a lesbian jurisprudence that
does not place itself at the center of the universe. Or imagine an-
other lesbian jurisprudence. And another.
Realizing Lesbian Jurisprudence
Theories suggest practice, and to the extent that any
imagined lesbian jurisprudence is impractical, it is invalidated. A
lesbian jurisprudence that takes as principles nonadvocacy and
nonpersuasion is not easily implemented by a lesbian attorney ar-
guing to a federal judge about the unconstitutionality of her les-
bian client's dismissal from the army. A lesbian jurisprudence that
values Oya's "going wild without provocation" is a lesbian jurispru-
dence that might refuse to hold a lesbian batterer accountable for
her actions. A lesbian jurisprudence that does not conceptualize it-
self as important is a lesbian jurisprudence easily discouraged from
its task. Is that a lesbian jurisprudence worth imagining?
The first concern is perhaps the most easily answered. If les-
bian jurisprudence does not insist upon paradigmatic status,7 8then
it does not aspire to apply its principles in every situation.
Trebilcot's article stresses that the principles "are not intended to
be used in situations that are predominantly patriarchal, that is,
when getting something from men is at stake ... .,"9 Thus, what
the imagined lesbian jurisprudence seems to imply is a contextual
jurisprudence. Lesbian jurisprudential theory does not demand
slavish implementation. Even if we imagined lesbian jurispru-
dence to embody a principle that "persuasion is violence," I think,
lesbian jurisprudence would countenance such persuasion in a
nonlesbian jurisprudential forum.
Such a solution necessarily implicates the concern of lesbian
separatism, an issue not as easily addressed as the question of a
methodology of argument in federal court. Separatism is a viable
solution which has many thoughtful proponents.8 0 Nevertheless, I
propose the more jurisprudential model of 'sovereignty' rather
than separatism for explaining possible imaginings of lesbian juris-
prudence. One analogy that might be helpful in explaining the
78. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
79. Trebilcot, supra note 76, at 3.
Of course there are situations-heteropatriarchal situations-in which
it is appropriate for me to attempt to change what others believe. Per-
suasion is appropriate when it is the best means for getting resources
for wimmin (including myself) from people with patriarchal power-
for example, in the context of a job or of political work that confronts
patriarchal institutions.
Id at 8.
80. See supra note 27.
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concept of sovereignty is that of the American Indian legal sys-
tems. They include tribal laws, courts and judges, recognized by
American jurisprudents.8 ' Indian tribal sovereignty is considered
to be both pre-constitutional and extra-constitutional. It is based
on an inherent notion of sovereignty, not on powers conferred by
the federal government.8 2 While "Lesbian Nation"83 lacks both
the recent history of sovereignty demonstrated by treaties and ex-
plicit territories evinced by reservations, some of the same princi-
ples of inherent sovereignty might provide an appropriate model.
The existence of Native sovereignty stands for the principle-if
not always the reality-that there can be more than one jurispru-
dential system.
Beyond the illusion of assimilation, legal theorists of color are
developing the idea of "multiple consciousness as jurisprudential
method." Mari Matsuda notes that women of color often employ
multiple consciousness as jurisrpudential method and provides this
example:
There are times to stand outside the courtroom and say "this
procedure is a farce, the legal system is corrupt, justice will
never prevail in this land as long as privilege rules in the
courtroom." There are times to stand inside the courtroom
and say "this is a nation of laws, laws recognizing fundamental
values of rights, equality and personhood." Sometimes, as An-
gela Davis did, there is a need to make both speeches in one
day. Is that crazy? Inconsistent? Not to Professor Davis....
[Her] decision to use a dualist approach to a repressive legal
system may well have saved her life.8 4
Like Angela Davis, many people move freely between "multi-
ple consciousness, multiple voice, double-voicedness-the shifting
consciousness that is the daily experience of people of color and of
women."8 This shifting occurs informally, as well as more for-
mally as in the instance of a Navaho woman who might utilize
81. See generally Samuel Brackel, American Indian Tribal Courts: The Costs of
Separate Justice (1978); Vine Deloria Jr. & Clifford Lytle, American Indians,
American Justice (1983); Vine Deloria Jr. & Clifford Lytle, The Nations Within
(1984); Kirke Kickingbird, Alexander Tallchief-Skibine & Lynn Kickingbird, In-
dian Jurisdiction (1983); Charles Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law
(1987).
82. See Charles Wilkinson, supra note 81, at 61-63. (discussing United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), and its progeny).
83. This phrase is Jill Johnston's. Jill Johnston, Lesbian Nation: The Feminist
Solution (1974). The image of tribe is often used among lesbian and gay men as a
source of identity; lesbians and gay men are sometimes referred to as "members of
the tribe."
84. Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Juris-
prudential Method, 11 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 7, 8 (1989).
85. Pat Williams, Response to Marl Matsuda, 11 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 11, 11
(1989).
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either the tribal courts or the federal courts,8 6 or state courts.
Similarly, a lesbian might utilize either a lesbian jurisprudential
construct or a patriarchal one, depending on the circumstances. In
certain circumstances, the choice between lesbian jurisprudential
methodologies and patriarchal ones might be obvious. For exam-
ple, it is rather senseless to summon the army that has dishonora-
bly discharged a lesbian because of her lesbianism to a lesbian
'tribunal' employing lesbian methodologies: the army will dishonor
the lesbian jurisprudential system as it has dishonored the lesbian.
I would also propose that lesbian relationship disagreements be
settled with reference to lesbian jurisprudential concepts rather
than patriarchal ones. A lesbian jurisprudential construct would,
of course, recognize such relationships and treat them seriously, a
result not assured in the patriarchal jurisprudential system. Per-
haps more importantly, however, is the possibility of imagining a
lesbian jurisprudence in such contexts: how do we want it to be,
really? This pragmatic application of the question that is lesbian
jurisprudence is beginning to be addressed in the context of dis-
solving couple relationships. Should it be mediation?8 7 Should it
be 'relationship contracts'?88 To what extent does a lesbian juris-
prudence adopt, alter, or abandon the conventions of patriarchal
jurisprudence? How should a lesbian jurisprudence respond to dif-
ferences of race and ethnicity, to class and age, to differences in
physical, mental, and spiritual realms? How do we want it to be,
really? The pragmatics of a lesbian jurisprudence might be forged
first in the hot aftertaste of lesbian desire.
Between the army and former lovers are ranges of situations
that station themselves less obviously in either patriarchal juris-
prudence or lesbian jurisprudence. One such situation, lesbian bat-
tering, raises the specter of the choice of appropriate metaphor. If
we reject balance as metaphor and choose instead Nemesis or Oya,
86. Of course, this does not mean that she-nor the lesbian -is assured her de-
sired result. See Catherine MacKinnon, Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez
v. Santa Clara Pueblo, in Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses
on Life and Law 63 (1987).
87. See Bonnie J. Englehardt & Katherine Triantafillou, Mediation For Lesbi-
ans, in Lesbian Psychologies: Explorations & Challenges 327 (Boston Lesbian Psy-
chologies Collective eds. 1987) (An informative dialogue between a social worker/
therapist and an attorney about their multi-disciplinary approach to mediating dis-
putes in lesbian personal and business relationships).
88. See, e.g., Ruthann Robson & Sarah Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Inti-
mate Partners, to be published in 63 Temp. L.Q. - (1990); see also Lenore Weitz-
man, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change-A Proposal for
Individual Contracts and Contracts in Lieu of Marriage, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 1169
(1974) (arguing for the validity of (heterosexual) contracts inside and in lieu of
marriage and providing sample contracts); Hayden Curry and Dennis Clifford,
Legal Guide for Lesbian and Gay Couples 2:27 (Robin Leonard 5th ed. 1989).
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does this mean lesbian jurisprudence would honor the one who
"sharpens her labyrs" on the stone of her lover or who "rips"
when denied recognition? Or would such a metaphor mean, con-
versely, that a lesbian batterer would be subject to retributive vio-
lence from the lesbian jurisprudence of which she is a part? Some
of the solution is adjusting the ascription of literalness to chosen
metaphors of lesbian jurisprudence. Another task is confrontation
of both the external (patriarchal) and internal (lesbian) problems
that confront both living lesbians and lesbianism as theory, and de-
cide in what ways a lesbian jurisprudence should concern itself
with these problems. To have as a tenet of lesbian jurisprudence
that intra-lesbian matters should be solved with reference to les-
bian jurisprudential precepts is fine, if those precepts adequately
address those intra-lesbian problems. In the matter of lesbian bat-
tering, we need to agitate not only for change within patriarchal
jurisprudential forums to allow lesbians access to patriarchal pro-
tection in the form of restraining orders against "non-married"
lovers, but also to consciously address lesbian battering as a lesbian
jurisprudential process. There might even come a time when
there is a lesbian jurisprudential device sufficient to deal with-
(and idealistically, to prevent) horizontal violence between
lesbians.8 9
Assuming even the most ideal situation, however, as long as
lesbians interact with nonlesbians the issue of the applicability of
lesbian jurisprudence remains a vexatious one. In some senses, the
issue is one of "jurisdiction," and any time there are concurrent
claims to sovereignty, there are jurisdictional disputes. 90 Re-
turning to the lesbian bowling team trying to obtain funding from
a university,91 to what extent should the bowling team advocate
(practice the violence of persuasion) to obtain its desired funding?
Under Trebilcot's theory, advocacy is fine in the context of at-
tempting to obtain a benefit for lesbians. Yet, deeper questions re-
main unresolved. To what extent should the lesbian bowling team
implement its ideas of lesbian jurisprudence in a nonjurispruden-
89. For further discussion of the phenomenon of violence between lesbians and
its implications for the question of lesbian jurisprudence, see Ruthann Robson, Lav-
ender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law & Lesbian Legal Theory, to be pub-
lished in 20 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. - (1990).
90. Again using the Indian Nations as an analogy, much of the United States
Supreme Court doctrinal analysis has been devoted to issues of conflicting claims to
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v.
Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 138 (1984); Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463
U.S. 545 (1983); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Additionally, ques-
tions of jurisdiction arise between states and between states and the federal
government.
91. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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tial context? There are important questions of methodology, such
as the content and degree of that persuasion. Should the lesbian
bowling team argue, as suggested earlier, that it not be measured
against any other teams? Even if this means losing its funding?
Such questions, in turn, raise even loftier issues such as the impli-
cations for a lesbian jurisprudence that abandons its own princi-
ples once it is outside its own territories, and the implications for a
lesbian jurisprudence that advances its principles in indifferent
and perhaps even hostile forums.
As we begin to puzzle theories to address such inquiries, we
develop a lesbian jurisprudence. We need to ask nothing less than
what principles, metaphors, and goals we would like to have em-
bodied in a lesbian jurisprudence and in what shapes and places we
would like that body of lesbian jurisprudence to appear. Obvi-
ously, this is a very important task.
Yet we also need to imagine a lesbian jurisprudence that
takes as a serious possibility the idea that it might not be central.
Not being central does not equal not being important. If we 'per-
sonalize' lesbian jurisprudence, we can apply this insight meant for
individual lesbians:
Many of us find ourselves taking it for granted that we need
boards of directors, presidents, elections and stars; that the
world is divided into the famous (or rich, or powerful, or beau-
tiful), the aspiring to be famous and those who pretend they
don't care; that some of us are more "evolved" than others
which confers upon us a higher place in the spiritual order;
that some occupations are more deserving of respect than
others.92
Jurisprudence, shed of its patriarchal pretensions and living in a
web of lesbian philosophies, may not be "more deserving of re-
spect" than other philosophies. But it would also not be deserving
of less. Lesbian jurisprudence is a question worth posing. Worth
imagining. Worth realizing.
92. Dykewomon, supra note 14, at 33.
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